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James consecrated the fourth chapter of
his Principles of Psychology to the expla-
nation of the idea of habit, for “when
we look at living creatures from an out-
ward point of view, one of the first things
that strike us is that they are bundles of
habits. In wild animals, the usual round of
daily behavior seems a necessity implanted
at birth; in animals domesticated, and
especially in man, it seems, to a great
extent, to be the result of education. The
habits to which there is an innate ten-
dency are called instincts; some of those
due to education would by most per-
sons be called acts of reason” (James,
1890).
The first relevant idea exposed by
William James concerns the importance of
plasticity in the development of all organic
forms. Habit, enabled by this universally
manifested–though in growing degrees-
plasticity, is the biological correlate of
the idea of natural law in the inanimate
universe. In his own words, “the laws of
Nature are nothing but the immutable
habits which the different elementary
sorts of matter follow in their actions
and reactions upon each other.” Habit
as the organic transposition of a natural
law constitutes one of the guiding princi-
ples of James approach to this category. Its
sources can be found in several authors.
One of them is Léon Dumont (1837–
1877), a French psychologist whose essay
De l’Habitude (Dumont, 1876) is quoted
by James in the above mentioned chapter.
In this text, Dumont, following August
Comte (1798–1857), had written that the
idea of habit expresses, better than anyone
else, the notion of a gradual acquisition of
new faculties. According to him, the evo-
lutionary perspective (recently discovered
at his time) finds a good ally in the idea of
habit, for it contains the progressive per-
fectibility of all beings, including man.
In his studies of habit, sensibility and
evolution, Dumont understood habit
in analogy with the laws of inanimate
nature.
A second major source of influ-
ence on James is the work of William
Benjamin Carpenter (1813–1885), an
English physician and physiologist who
had done extensive work on comparative
neurology. He spoke in terms of “adap-
tive unconscious” (Carpenter, 1874), in
which there are resonances of Hermann
von Helmholtz’s (1821–1894) conception
of thought and perception as drawing
unconscious hypotheses and inferring
probabilistic accounts about the sur-
rounding environment (Helmholtz, 1867).
According to this theory, thought and per-
ception would operate, to a large extent,
without awareness, and we would remain
unconscious about a substantial body of
mental phenomena which we consider
rooted in the deepest powers of con-
sciousness. As in the case of Dumont,
in Carpenter there is a clear influence of
Darwin’s theory of evolution.
James conceived of a habit as the fruit
of the exceptional plasticity of organic
life, whose versatility would have played
a significant role in favoring the adap-
tion to different environment, needs, and
challenges. But beyond the biological
and evolutionary basis of habits, James
wanted to unfold the formation of this
kind of automatized behavior. To answer
this question, he found inspiration in
the work of English utilitarian philoso-
phers like Alexander Bain (1818–1903)
and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Bain,
a Scottish psychologist and a leading
figure of empiricism, had like Mill (whom
he revered) endorsed an association-
ist approach to the acquisition of new
behaviors (Bain, 1868).
James went a step further and delin-
eated a refined view of habits in which
the ideas of plasticity, automatization, and
association were carefully bounded. For
him, a habit corresponded to a general
form of discharge that helped concentrate
energies on unpredicted challenges. As
he wrote, following Carpenter’s idea that
our nervous system grows to the modes
in which it has been exercised, “habit sim-
plifies the movements required to achieve
a given result, makes them more accurate
and diminishes fatigue” (James, 1890).
In James’ view, this is perhaps the most
remarkable feature of a habit: it dimin-
ishes the conscious attention with which
our acts are performed. The precedents
to this idea can be found in the work
of the French spiritualist philosopher
François-Pierre Maine de Biran (1766–
1824). According to James, the ability to
act without the concourse of will has clear
advantages. In a habitual action, mere
sensation suffices for eliciting muscular
movements, so that the upper regions
of the brain and mind are set “com-
paratively free,” unless they go wrong
and they immediately call our atten-
tion (James, 1890). This liberation shows
extremely beneficial for displaying a larger
array of actions.
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